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Abstract  
 
The Space Shuttle Program is aggressively flying the Space 
Shuttle manifest for assembling the International Space Station and 
servicing the Hubble Space Telescope. Completing this flight 
manifest while concurrently transitioning to the Exploration 
architecture creates formidable challenges; the most notable of which 
is retaining critical skills within the Shuttle Program workforce. The 
Program must define a strategy that will allow safe and efficient fly-
out of the Shuttle, while smoothly transitioning Shuttle assets (both 
human and facility) to support early flight demonstrations required in 
the development of NASA’s Crew Exploration Vehicle (Orion) and 
Crew and Cargo Launch Vehicles (Ares I). The Program must 
accomplish all of this while maintaining the current level of resources. 
Therefore, it will be necessary to initiate major changes in operations 
and contracting. Overcoming these challenges will be essential for 
NASA to fly the Shuttle safely, accomplish the  “Vision for Space 
Exploration,” and ultimately meet the national goal of maintaining a 
robust space program. This paper will address the Space Shuttle 
Program’s strategy and its current status in meeting these 
challenges.  
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I. Summary  
 
This paper provides a current status of the strategic and tactical planning in 
place to fly the remaining Space Shuttle flights and ultimately retire the Program.  
Though the Space Shuttle Program is scheduled to come to an end in 2010, it 
would be a grave misperception to conclude that the demands placed on the 
Program have lessened. The Space Shuttle Program will complete the assembly 
of the International Space Station (ISS), giving it the capability to support a crew 
of six and significant increases in level of research. Shuttle will also perform 
repairs to the Hubble Space Telescope (HST), thus extending its ability to 
continue astronomical discovery for years. Between now and program retirement, 
a mere three years away, Shuttle will fly more missions than were flown during 
the entire Apollo Program. Executing the transition and retirement (T & R) of the 
Space Shuttle Program while remaining operational without compromising flight 
safety adds a new layer of complexity to an already healthy challenge.  
 
NASA’s projected budget is basically flat. Supporting three human space flight 
programs (Shuttle, Station and Constellation) within it requires some very 
innovative planning including retiring unneeded Shuttle assets as soon as 
possible, thus reducing Shuttle costs while freeing up assets needed for 
Constellation Program (CxP). This activity has already started and will accelerate 
over the next few years. As a result, some Shuttle contracts to vendors and 
suppliers have or soon will be terminated. Often these decisions are irreversible 
without  significant cost to recover the capability should it be needed later.  
 
Systems requirements for CxP are in formulation and many design contracts 
have not yet been selected. So, their needs for Shuttle assets are currently 
uncertain. This, along with the general requirement for CxP to significantly 
reduce operating costs, has resulted in the transfer of fewer Shuttle assets to 
CxP than was originally planned. Therefore, most Shuttle assets will be released 
and/or archived. This has lead to a disconnect between the skill sets required by 
SSP and those required by CxP; thereby introducing significant risk to the Shuttle 
Program’s ability to retain critical skills as many in the workforce have 
transitioned to support the new program, Constellation. 
 
II. Space Shuttle Program Status 
 
The Space Shuttle, International Space Station and Constellation human 
space flight programs have a considerable role in meeting America’s 
fundamental goal for Space Exploration, namely “ to advance U. S. scientific, 
security, and economic interests”i. NASA’s exploration road map (fig.1) shows 
the relationship between flying out the Shuttle, assembling and supporting the 
ISS, returning humans to the Moon, and developing the capability to go to Mars 
and beyond. The key to meeting these goals is NASA’s ability to bridge the gap 
from the Shuttle Program to Constellation without a significant negative impact to 
the U.S. Space Leadership role.   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  NASA’s Exploration Roadmap  
 
 
Once the Space Shuttle Program’s aggressive manifest (fig.2) to assemble 
the International Space Station and repair the Hubble Space Telescope is 
complete, the SSP will have fulfilled its primary role in implementing the Vision 
for Space Exploration (VSE) and can then be retired. This will clear the path for 
building a new generation of spacecraft that will take humans back to the Moon 
and beyond.  
 
 
Figure 2.   Flight Assignment Working Group (FAWG) Manifest 
 
Note that although the flight manifest extends through 2010, the first Shuttle 
Orbiter (Atlantis, OV-104) is scheduled to be retired in 2008. It will be preserved 
as a “donor” vehicle and will be used as a source of spare parts for the remaining 
flights of Discovery (OV-103) and Endeavour (OV-105). 
 
There is at least one potential threat to NASA’s ability to retire the Space 
Shuttle Program at the end of 2010. Unplanned launch delays that cause an 
unforeseen slip in the entire manifest would result in an Agency decision to either 
continue flights post 2010 to satisfactorily complete ISS assembly or to stand fast 
to the 2010 deadline and leave the Station unfinished. However, there are 
currently no contingency plans to fly or support Shuttle fights after 2010 for this or 
any other unknown threats. Therefore, there will be no U.S. human spaceflight 
capability after 2010 until the new Constellation vehicles, Ares I and Orion, are 
available. 
 
A multi-program integrated manifest (fig. 3) shows the remaining Shuttle 
flights, candidate logistics flights to support the ISS, and the planned 
Constellation test and crewed flights During “the gap”, the period between SSP 
operations and CxP operations, ISS crew rotation and logistical support will be 
provided internationally. COTS may be able to supplement these needs should 
they be ready in time.  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Multi-Program Integrated Milestones  
(FY 2008 President’s Budget) 
 
III. Transition and Retirement (T & R) 
 
As previously noted, the VSE and the current Shuttle manifest indicate that the 
final flight of the Space Shuttle is approximately three years away. Efforts have 
been in place at NASA Headquarters and within the Space Shuttle Program over 
the last two years to assure that the retirement of the program can be effected 
without undue risk to either the remaining shuttle flights or the viability of future 
agency programs and projects. 
The terms transition and retirement have been used interchangeably, but the 
following distinctions should be made. “Transition” has been a favored term 
based on the notion that a significant percentage of the Space Shuttle flight 
hardware, facilities, capabilities, and personnel will provide the foundation for 
future agency programs and projects. “Retirement” is a more technically correct 
term when applied to the Space Shuttle Program as a whole, since the program 
officially is scheduled to end shortly after the final shuttle flight in 2010. 
 
a. The Transition Management Approach 
 
Following the announcement of the VSE, the Space Shuttle Program initiated 
a benchmarking review of similar scale program cancellations in the aerospace 
and defense industries. Of particular interest were the management approaches 
to assure the integrity of ongoing operations following the announcement of a 
fixed retirement date. While many enterprises established separate management 
structures to direct the operational program and the retirement effort, NASA 
chose to leave both responsibilities under the direction of the Space Shuttle 
Program Manager. The principal rationale was that the overriding concern for 
flight safety and mission success would potentially be compromised by a 
separate management team making independent decisions about program 
assets, capabilities, vendors, and staffing. 
 
Currently, the day-to-day T&R responsibility within the Space Shuttle Program 
is vested in a “Transition Manager”, who is one of three deputies to the Space 
Shuttle Program Manager. A virtual transition leadership team has been 
established that includes representatives from the Shuttle interests at the four 
human space flight centers, as well as experts in resource management and 
procurement strategy. There are three groups that provide direct support to this 
leadership team. First, a support staff drawn mainly from the Space Shuttle 
Strategic Planning Office provides a project management framework for 
transition, including documentation, schedules, risk management systems, and 
metrics. Second, a group of crosscutting function managers addresses program-
wide requirements in areas such as human capital planning, workforce 
communications, records management, environmental planning, real property 
disposition, and personal property disposition. Finally, each Space Shuttle 
Project element and support organization provides an individual dedicated to 
transition planning and execution. 
 
In addition to the transition management structure within the Program 
described above, transition managers have been appointed in both the Space 
Operations Mission Directorate (SOMD) and the Exploration Systems Mission 
Directorate (ESMD) at NASA Headquarters.  
 
b. Transition Strategic Planning 
 
The strategic aspect of transition planning involves the long range look at 
Space Shuttle capabilities, their potential applicability to future agency programs, 
and the budgetary requirements that arise because of retirement. 
 
The review of long term capability needs is provided by a Strategic 
Capabilities Assessment (SCA) data base. This data base has partitioned the 
complete Shuttle Program into approximately 300 distinct capabilities.ii For each 
capability, an assessment of the assets and skills is provided, along with the 
estimated last need date based on the projected shuttle manifest. While a 
majority of these capabilities are required until the end of the program, many 
capabilities associated with flight hardware production are already at or beyond 
their last need dates. For example, procurement of the raw materials required to 
produce external tanks has basically ended, and the production lines for major 
main engine components are scheduled to be shut down by the end of 2007. 
 
An assessment of the Space Shuttle capabilities is currently ongoing in the 
Constellation Program to determine which of these can directly or indirectly 
support their objectives. Solid Rocket Booster capabilities obviously provide 
direct benefit because the Ares I configuration utilizes a single booster rocket as 
its primary source of lift capability. Other capabilities may provide indirect 
support, because the useful part of the capability is not the flight hardware itself, 
but possibly the test facilities, subsystems and components, or the engineering 
expertise associated with that capability. 
 
The budgeting part of the strategic planning for transition involves utilizing 
benchmarking, predictive models, and bottoms up analysis to estimate the 
unique costs that are occasioned by the retirement of the Space Shuttle. 
  
c. The Transition Tactical Decision Process 
 
As each Shuttle capability approaches its last need date, a process has been 
established to thoroughly review the implications of terminating or transferring 
that capability before final decisions are made. The review package is referred to 
as the “smart” document, actually an acronym that stands for Space Shuttle 
Management Resource Transition Document. Included in the review is 
information about the capability, the expected disposition, the costs of 
disposition, the risk to the ongoing operational program, and the costs to recover 
the capability if the strategic objectives of the agency change at a future date. 
 
A formal board structure exists (fig.4)to review these decision packages at all 
levels. At the program level, the Transition Program Requirements Control Board 
or TPRCB performs a technical, budget, and risk review before confirming the 
recommendation to terminate or transfer the capability. This board is chaired by 
the Shuttle Program Transition Manager. At the agency level, a Transition 
Control Board further assesses the impacts of the more important 
recommendations forwarded by the shuttle program. This board is chaired by the 
two agency level directors responsible for space operations and exploration 
systems, with representation from several other critical agency offices. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. ESMD/SOMD Transition Board Overview 
 
 
d. Transition Activity in 2007 
 
This year, 2007, appears to be a critical year for the planned retirement of the 
Space Shuttle Program. Some of the key transitions manufacturing decision 
dates are shown on figure 5. A small but significant set of capability decisions are 
being made that lead some to declare 2007 “the year of no return” on the 
decision to complete Shuttle activities by the end of September 2010, meaning 
that the ability to continue flying the Shuttle beyond 2010 would either be lost or 
at the best, extremely cost prohibitive. Contracts for the procurement of the raw 
materials used to produce the External Tanks have already been terminated, and 
the floor space at the start of the tank production lines is being assessed for the 
use of future programs. An increasing number of vendors that supply Orbiter 
subsystems and components have seen their final orders for parts. More 
significantly, production lines for Space Shuttle Main Engine turbopumps, 
powerheads, and main combustion chambers will be shut down by the end of the 
year. Finally, one of two main engine test stands at the Stennis Space Center in 
Mississippi has already been deeded over to the Constellation Program for 
testing of the J2X engine. 
 
 
 
 Figure 5.  Shuttle Transition Strategic Capabilities Last Need Milestones 
 
 
e. Assessing Transition Risk 
 
The announcement of Space Shuttle retirement introduces two general 
categories of risk. The first addresses the unique risks to the remaining 
operational program; the second addresses longer term threats to the agency 
resulting from the rapid termination of a program that involves a significant 
percentage of NASA’s physical assets and workforce. 
 
Risks to the remaining operational program include the retention of critical 
skills, the viability of the supply chain, and the maintenance of the physical 
assets required to launch safely and effectively. The critical skill retention issue is 
most significant, because an incentive has been created for each individual to 
look at career opportunities outside of the Space Shuttle Program that may have 
longer term security or better opportunities for advancement. Similarly, suppliers 
are incentivized to review their business plans, and to possibly opt out of current 
or future NASA work. 
 
Shuttle retirement also introduces risks and cost threats that do not directly 
affect ongoing operations. The primary threat is whether the agency can 
effectively close down the Space Shuttle Program without sizable budgets that 
would stymie the development of future programs and projects. Another question 
is whether the existing property management organizations within NASA can 
handle the upcoming tidal wave of property disposition decisions.  
 
 
f. Measuring Transition Effectiveness 
 
The transition and retirement effort, like any other sizable NASA project, has 
established measures of effectiveness that are reported on a quarterly basis to 
the agency level Transition Control Board. Among the categories of metrics 
presented (fig. 6) are costs, cost avoidance, human capital allocation among 
programs and centers, workforce communications and survey results, and 
property disposition. 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Transition Metrics Overview & Accountability 
 
Within the program and associated projects, other measurements are 
gathered and analyzed that collectively paint a picture about the overall 
effectiveness of the transition and retirement effort. 
 
g. Budgeting for Shuttle Retirement 
 
The retirement of the Space Shuttle Program is expected to be a costly effort 
that comes at the precise time when the agency is trying to maximize its 
allocation to future program and project development. Estimates for the cost of 
retirement have ranged between $1 and $3 Billion, with wide variations based on 
the assumptions and time phasing of the shutdown effort. 
 
To this point, only about $30 Million has been spent on retirement, primarily to 
cover the initial planning activities and the costs associated with the several 
capabilities already being retired or transferred to other programs. It is expected 
that about 20% of the overall cost will occur while the Shuttle Program continues 
in operation. The remaining 80% would be spent after the final flight in 2010. 
 
The largest single cost is associated with the disposition of close to one 
million items of personal property (flight hardware, test equipment, processing 
equipment and the like) and real property (land and buildings at multiple sites 
within the NASA and contractor locations). Other costs are associated with post-
shutdown staffing requirements, incentives to current personnel, contract 
closeout activities, and environmental remediation. 
 
h. The Broader Impact of Shuttle Retirement 
 
The retirement of the Apollo program following the last lunar mission in 1972 
had a significant negative impact on NASA and its associated aerospace 
contractors. Although the impact of the Space Shuttle retirement should not be 
as far-reaching, it will tale a concerted effort by NASA leadership to assure that 
the effort is managed to soften the overall impact.  
 
A primary concern to the agency is the length of the “gap”, the time between 
the final Shuttle launch to the first crewed launch of the Constellation Program. 
The longer the gap, the more difficult it is to maintain the skills, the staffing, and 
the infrastructure to ensure safe, effective, and regular access to space. 
 
A second concern is the loss of capabilities that only exist in the Space 
Shuttle system. While future vehicles will enable destinations that are not 
accessible to the Space Shuttle, there is a significant loss of capability 
associated with on-orbit repair and retrieval of satellites, and the ability to return 
sizable mass to earth. 
 
A final concern centers on the leadership role that the United States plays in 
space. When President Bush announced the Vision for Space Exploration, he 
tied it specifically to the need to protect and promote our long term scientific, 
economic, and national security interests. The Space Shuttle has been used to 
promote these national interests, while at the same time providing a myriad of 
opportunities for international cooperation and direct participation in the great 
adventure of human space flight.  
 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
The Space Shuttle Program has critical milestones and tasks ahead in order to 
complete assembly of the Space Station and repair the Hubble Space 
Telescope. The transition and retirement of the Space Shuttle Program is a 
formidable activity essential to completing its mission and meeting the nation’s 
Vision for Space Exploration.  As always, safe flight and mission success are the 
fundamental decision drivers. Transition management boards are in place and 
lines of communication have been established. Space Shuttle contractors, 
vendors and suppliers are phasing out while work for the Constellation program 
is picking up (figs.7&8). After the Shuttle retires, a gap in U. S. human spaceflight 
capability is certain without some change in national policy or budget increase. In 
the meantime, decisions are being made now that limit future options.  If a gap is 
a concern, alternatives should be evaluated soon.   
 
Figure 7.  SSP Work Locations             Figure 8.  CxP Work Locations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
                                                 
i  “A Renewed Spirit of Discovery: The President’s Vision for U.S. Space Exploration” (speech), given by 
President George W. Bush on February 4, 2003.  
ii  For the purposes of the SSP Transition and Retirement effort, Capability is defined as the logical 
breakdown of program elements’ property, personnel, suppliers, and contracts into functional groupings 
that provide product(s) or service(s) 
